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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1038 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
IRA LITTLEJOHN, JR., 
          Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2:96-cr-00195) 
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 4, 2013) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ira Littlejohn, Jr. (“Littlejohn”) appeals the December 23, 2011 Judgment of the 
District Court revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a term of 
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imprisonment of 21 months.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s Judgment. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1997, Littlejohn pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to 
distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 188 months, and was 
released in 2008, pursuant to retroactive changes in the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).   
In February 2011, while on supervised release, Littlejohn tested positive for 
marijuana, opiates, codeine, and morphine, in violation of the conditions of his 
supervised release.  Additionally, in April 2011, he was arrested by the City of Pittsburgh 
police and charged with various drug offenses.  On April 19, 2011, the probation 
department filed a petition for action on Littlejohn’s supervised release, based on the 
positive drug test and the arrest for a controlled substance offense.1
  On December 22, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on Littlejohn’s 
violations of supervised release.  Because the state drug charges against Littlejohn had 
 
                                              
1 The petition indicated two violations of supervised release.  The first violation, 
related to the arrest, charged Littlejohn with violating the conditions of his supervised 
release that prohibited him from committing another federal, state, or local crime, and 
from illegally possessing a controlled substance.  The second violation, related to the 
positive drug test, charged Littlejohn with violating the condition of his supervised 
release that prohibited him from unlawfully using a controlled substance. 
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been withdrawn and Littlejohn had pleaded guilty to two counts of disorderly conduct, 
the District Court amended the first charge in the petition to allege that Littlejohn violated 
the conditions of his release by committing the state offense of disorderly conduct.  
Littlejohn admitted to both violations — that he had committed the state crime of 
disorderly conduct and that he had used a controlled substance.   
The District Court then determined that because of the positive drug test, 
Littlejohn had also violated the condition of his release providing that he not illegally 
possess a controlled substance, as well as the condition providing that he not unlawfully 
use a controlled substance.  The Court noted that the offense of simple possession would 
constitute a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844, and that because of Littlejohn’s prior drug 
convictions, his conduct would be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one 
year.  The District Court thus determined that this offense constituted a Grade B violation 
of supervised release, under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).2
                                              
2 Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1, there are three grades of supervised release violations.  
Relevant to our discussion, a Grade B violation occurs when the defendant engages in 
conduct that constitutes a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year, and a Grade C violation occurs when a defendant 
engages in conduct that constitutes a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term 
of imprisonment of less than one year, or otherwise violates a condition of supervised 
release.  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a).  Where there are multiple violations of supervised release, 
the grade of the violation is determined by the violation having the most serious grade.  
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(b).   
  The Court further reasoned that it 
was required to revoke Littlejohn’s supervised release under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1) and 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), and determined that the applicable Guidelines range was 21 to 27 
months.   
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Littlejohn’s attorney protested that the Government’s violations worksheet had 
calculated Littlejohn’s violations — for committing the state offense of disorderly 
conduct and using a controlled substance — as Grade C violations, carrying a Guidelines 
range of 8 to 14 months.  The Government admitted that it had calculated the violations 
as Grade C, but that it had not considered “the fact that [Littlejohn’s] use of the opiates 
and the marijuana constituted possession for purposes of elevating it to a Grade B.”  
(App. 18a.)  The Court responded that the Government’s original calculation of the 
controlled substance offense as a Grade C violation was not correct, and that “it [was] a 
Grade B violation.”  (Id.)  The District Court imposed a sentence of 21 months.  
Littlejohn filed a timely notice of appeal.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
JURISDICTION  
III. 
Littlejohn presents two issues on appeal.  He first argues that he was denied due 
process at his revocation hearing because he was not given notice that his positive drug 
test could be considered evidence of drug possession, and could thus qualify as a Grade B 
violation of supervised release.  Second, he challenges the sentence imposed by the 
District Court as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and also argues that the 
offense of simple possession of marijuana should not have been considered to give rise to 
a term of imprisonment exceeding one year because the Government never filed an 
information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. 
ANALYSIS 
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A. Due Process Claim 
We normally review de novo a claim of denial of due process at a revocation 
hearing.  See United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, 
because Littlejohn did not raise his due process argument before the District Court, we 
review his claim for plain error.  See United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 248-49 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“As [appellant] failed to preserve his objections at the revocation hearing, we 
review the decision of the District Court for plain error.”).   
At Littlejohn’s revocation hearing, counsel for Littlejohn objected to the District 
Court’s classification of Littlejohn’s offense as a Grade B violation, but he did not argue 
that the District Court’s determination violated Littlejohn’s due process rights.  The 
Supreme Court has explained that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b), in 
order to preserve claims of error, parties are required to “‘inform[] the court — when the 
court ruling or order is made or sought — of the action the party wishes the court to take, 
or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for that objection.’”  Puckett 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b)).   
Here, counsel for Littlejohn did not specify the grounds for his objection to the 
District Court’s classification of Littlejohn’s violation of supervised release as a Grade B 
violation.  Littlejohn’s contention that the District Court wrongly classified the violation 
is not the equivalent of raising a claim before the District Court that such a classification 
violated his right to notice.  The District Court’s determination is therefore reviewed for 
plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 
(1993).   
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Under the plain error standard, “‘before an appellate court can correct an error not 
raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial 
rights.  If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion 
to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  United States v. Vazquez, 271 
F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-36.  A “deviation 
from a legal rule is an error,” and that error is “plain” when it is “clear or obvious.”  
Plotts, 359 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  As we discuss 
below, because the District Court committed no plain error, we hold that Littlejohn’s due 
process rights were not violated. 
 Although revocation of supervised release, like “revocation of probation . . . [and] 
revocation of parole, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, it ‘does result in a loss of 
liberty,’ and is subject, therefore, to ‘minimum requirements of due process.’”  Barhnart, 
980 F.2d at 222 (citation omitted) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 
(1973)).  At issue here is the due process requirement that before revocation of 
supervised release, an individual must be provided with written notice of the alleged 
violation.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) (requiring that a defendant at a revocation 
hearing be given written notice of the alleged violation of supervised release). However, 
a defendant in a supervised release hearing is not entitled to “the full panoply of rights” 
due a defendant in a criminal proceeding.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 
(1972).  The notice requirement serves to ensure that the defendant understands the 
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nature of the alleged violation and can thus prepare a defense.  See United States v. 
Sistrunk, 612 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2010) (“For notice to be effective, it need only 
assure that the defendant understands the nature of the alleged violation.”); United States 
v. Chatelain, 360 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The notice must be sufficient to allow 
the releasee to prepare to defend against the charges.”). 
Littlejohn argues that his due process rights were violated because he had no 
notice that his positive drug test could be considered evidence of drug possession by the 
District Court.  He claims that the petition on supervised release only charged him with 
“unlawful use” of a controlled substance related to his February 23, 2011 positive drug 
test, and that therefore, the District Court’s “sua sponte” determination that his conduct 
constituted unlawful possession violated the requirement that he be given written notice 
of the claimed violations.  (Supp. Br. for Appellant 7.)  He further claims that he 
stipulated to the violation of supervised release with the understanding that the positive 
drug test constituted a Grade C violation, and that he would have contested the violation 
had he been given notice that his positive drug test would be considered evidence of 
possession, a Grade B violation. 
Littlejohn’s claim lacks merit because, under our precedent, a District Court may 
treat a positive drug test as circumstantial evidence of drug possession, United States v. 
Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 891 (3d Cir. 1991), and Littlejohn was therefore on notice that 
his positive drug test could be construed as evidence of drug possession, United States v. 
Gordon, 961 F.2d 426, 429-30 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Blackston, we held that where an 
individual violates supervised release by using a controlled substance, the district court 
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may treat that use as circumstantial evidence that the individual also possessed the 
controlled substance, and thereby impose a more severe penalty for the violation.  940 
F.2d at 891-92; see also United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“There is no dispute that Bungar used cocaine in violation of a condition of his 
supervised release, and that his testing positive for cocaine use constituted circumstantial 
evidence of simple possession, a grade B violation.” (citing Blackston, 940 F.2d at 892)).   
Blackston did not address whether the appellant was given sufficient notice that 
his use of the controlled substance could qualify as possession, and instead focused only 
on whether the court could treat use as evidence of possession for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(g). 3
                                              
3 The version of § 3583(g) in effect at that time provided that if the district court 
found that a defendant possessed a controlled substance, his supervised release was to be 
revoked and he was to be sentenced to a prison term not less than one-third of the term of 
supervised release.  Section 3583(g) has since been amended, and no longer specifies a 
minimum prison term, but still mandates the revocation of supervised release if the 
defendant possesses a controlled substance.  Therefore, the analysis in Blackston is still 
applicable to the amended § 3583(g).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b). 
  However, in United States v. Gordon, we held that a defendant received 
adequate notice under Rule 32.1 where the probation violation petition did not formally 
charge her with use or possession of a controlled substance, but the district court 
nevertheless relied on two positive drug tests to determine that she had possessed a 
controlled substance in violation of her probation.  961 F.3d at 429-30.  We reasoned that 
the defendant “had adequate pre-hearing notice that her drug possession would be 
considered by the district court” because the petition “cited the two positive urine 
specimens which she submitted.”  Id. at 429. Therefore, “[f]rom this written petition, [the 
defendant] should have anticipated that she would be questioned about her drug 
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possession at the probation violation hearing.”  Id.; see also Bungar, 478 F.3d at 542 
(noting that the petition on supervised release only charged defendant with use of a 
controlled substance, a Grade C violation, but that the district court instead determined 
that defendant had possessed a controlled substance, a Grade B violation). 
 Here, Littlejohn’s petition on supervised release indicated that his positive drug 
test violated the condition of his supervised release which mandated that he refrain from  
using a controlled substance.4
B. Reasonableness of Sentence 
  It was not error for the District Court to treat the positive 
drug test as circumstantial evidence of possession, and under our precedent, the petition 
gave Littlejohn sufficient notice of the alleged violation to comply with the notice 
provisions of Rule 32.1.   
Littlejohn next contends that the District Court’s imposition of a 21 month 
sentence for his violation of supervised release was unreasonable.  We review the District 
Court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion, and must give deference to the 
court’s factual determinations.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  We review 
for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Our review “‘begins by ensur[ing] that the district 
court committed no significant procedural error, such as [(1)] failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, [(2)] treating the 
Guidelines as mandatory, [(3)] failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, or 
                                              
4 The petition also charged Littlejohn with violating the condition of his 
supervised release that he “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” in relation to the 
state drug charges, which were subsequently withdrawn.  (App. 12a.) 
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[(4)] selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the 
Guidelines range.’”  Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  If a 
sentencing court’s procedure “passes muster,” then at stage two, we will review the 
sentence for substantive reasonableness.  Id.  “Our substantive review requires us not to 
focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.  The burden of 
demonstrating unreasonableness is borne by the party challenging the sentence, and “if 
the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, will affirm it unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Id. at 568; see also Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 
(“We may not substitute our judgment for the sentencing court’s, but will affirm if we are 
convinced that ‘the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory 
range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors’ 
in light of the circumstances of the case.” (quoting United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 
197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006))). 
When a sentence is imposed for a violation of supervised release, additional 
considerations must be taken into account.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), a district court, 
after considering the § 3553(a) factors, may revoke a term of supervised release and 
sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment if the court finds, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the defendant violated the terms of supervised release.  Bungar, 478 
F.3d at 543-44.  The sentence is imposed “primarily to sanction the defendant’s breach of 
trust [but should] . . . ‘tak[e] into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the 
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underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.’”  Id. at 544 (quoting United 
States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006)).  The district court must also consider 
the policy statements under Chapter 7 of the Guidelines, although the sentencing ranges 
set forth in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) are merely advisory.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(5).   
 1. Procedural Reasonableness 
There is no dispute that Littlejohn tested positive for controlled substances in 
violation of his supervised release conditions, “and that his testing positive for [drug] use 
constituted circumstantial evidence of simple possession.”  Bungar, 478 F.3d at 544 
(citing Blackston, 940 F.2d at 892).  However, Littlejohn argues that his sentence is 
procedurally unreasonable because the District Court erred in considering his violation of 
supervised release a Grade B violation, thereby incorrectly calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range.  For a violation of supervised release to constitute a Grade B violation, 
the conduct must constitute a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year.  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).   
Under 21 U.S.C. § 844, possession of a controlled substance is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year only if the defendant has previously been 
convicted of a drug offense.  Although Littlejohn was previously convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, he argues that he could not have 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for the current violation 
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because the Government had not filed an information with the Court pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 851.5
Under 21 U.S.C. § 851, before a person “convicted of an offense” under that 
chapter may be subjected to an increased punishment for one or more prior convictions, 
the government, before trial or before the entry of a guilty plea, must file an information 
with the court stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.  Section 851, 
by its own terms, applies to the government’s effort to secure a conviction, not to the 
district court’s determination of whether conduct constitutes a violation of supervised 
release.  Furthermore, in the supervised release context, the grade of the violation is 
determined based on the actual conduct of the defendant, irrespective of how and whether 
the government chooses to prosecute that conduct.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1 (“The 
grade of violation does not depend upon the conduct that is the subject of criminal 
charges or of which the defendant is convicted in a criminal proceeding.  Rather, the 
grade of the violation is to be based on the defendant’s actual conduct.”).  Therefore, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the crime is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 
one year, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2), not whether the government actually charges the 
defendant with a crime and seeks the enhanced sentence based on previous criminal 
conduct.     
  Littlejohn’s reliance on § 851 is misplaced and his argument lacks merit. 
                                              
5 Because Littlejohn did not raise this specific objection before the District Court, 
the Government contends that his claim is subject to plain error review.  However, 
regardless of which standard of review applies — plain error or abuse of discretion — his 
claim fails. 
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Moreover, Littlejohn does not cite any authority for his contention that the 
government must file an information under § 851 before a district court, in a revocation 
proceeding, can consider a subsequent drug offense under § 844 to be punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year.  In fact, the weight of authority suggests that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by deeming Littlejohn to have committed a 
Grade B violation.  See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 542 (affirming reasonableness of sentence 
where the district court relied on § 844 to find that simple possession of a controlled 
substance constituted a Grade B violation of supervised release); see also United States v. 
Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2010) (determining that a defendant’s prior drug 
convictions made his drug possession offense a Grade B violation of supervised release 
under § 844). 
Littlejohn’s remaining arguments regarding the procedural unreasonableness of his 
sentence are equally unavailing.6
                                              
6 Littlejohn argues that the District Court is not required to revoke supervised 
release every time a defendant tests positive for drug use.  Although the District Court is 
not required to revoke supervised release after a defendant tests positive for drug use, see 
Blackston, 940 F.2d at 885-86, our precedent establishes that it may, see id. at 891-92.  
The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion by treating Littlejohn’s positive 
drug test as circumstantial evidence of drug possession.  Littlejohn also argues that his 
sentence is procedurally unreasonable because of the claimed violation of his due process 
rights.  However, because we have determined that Littlejohn’s right to notice under Rule 
32.1 was not violated, he cannot argue that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable on 
this ground. 
  A review of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that 
the District Court calculated the Guidelines range and considered the § 3553(a) factors in 
determining the appropriate sentence.  Accordingly, the District Court committed no 
procedural error and, “absent any significant procedural error, we must ‘give due 
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deference to the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,’ 
justify the sentence.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).   
  2. Substantive Reasonableness 
 Littlejohn also argues that his sentence of 21 months for a positive drug test is 
substantively unreasonable.  In support of this contention, Littlejohn points to a lone 
Sixth Circuit case where a defendant received a more lenient sentence after failing nine 
urine tests.  See United States v. Lester, 76 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1996).  Littlejohn has failed 
to meet his burden of demonstrating that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.  
Even if we were to conclude “that a different sentence was appropriate,” such a 
determination “is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 
51.  Because the sentence is procedurally sound, “we will affirm it unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Littlejohn’s sentence, 
therefore, is substantively reasonable.    
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
